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Abstract
We introduce the concept of an operator decision making technique and apply it to
a concrete political problem: should a given political party form a coalition or not?
We focus on the situation of three political parties, and divide the electorate into
four groups: partisan supporters of each party and a group of undecided voters. We
consider party-party interactions of two forms: shared or differing alliance attitudes.
Our main results consist of time-dependent decision functions for each of the three
parties, and their asymptotic values, i.e., their final decisions on whether or not to
form a coalition.
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I Introduction
In the last few years the scientific literature has seen a growing interest in the possibility
of using quantum ideas and quantum tools in the description of some aspects of several
macroscopic systems, systems which, in the common understanding, are usually thought
to be purely classical. This interest has touched very different fields of science, from
finance to ecology, from psychology to decision making, and so on. The literature is now
very rich, and it increases almost every day. We just cite here some recent monographs,
which cover some of the areas just mentioned, but not only: [1]-[6].
Recently, [7], we have proposed a dynamical approach for a very simple and well known
problem in decision making, somehow following what was previously done in [8, 9]. That
work was about a certain version of the two prisoners game, and the main output of our
treatment was the deduction of their final decisions (i.e., their decisions when t → ∞),
both when they do mutually interact and when they do not.
Here we apply the same general framework to a problem which is rather common in
politics. Let us start with a short historical introduction, useful to motivate our interest in
this problem: in 2013, the results of the Italian political elections produced no real winner.
Three parties took more or less the same number of votes: the Partito Democratico (PD),
who was really the first party in that election, but which was not strong enough to govern
alone, the Popolo della Liberta` (PdL) and the Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S), both sufficiently
strong to have, if allied with PD, much more than the 50% of votes. The other parties
took only few votes to really have any power. It was clear to any observer that, to govern,
PD had to form a coalition with PdL or with M5S, and the natural choice was to try
to form a somehow left-oriented government PD-M5S. However, M5S decided not to ally
with PD, despite of the fact that many of its electors disapproved that choice. After a
long impasse, Enrico Letta (PD) started to collaborate with PdL and they created a new
grand coalition government, even if a large part of the PD electors was contrary to such
a coalition with Berlusconi’s party. Summarizing, in a single election we had, in just few
weeks, two similar coalition problems: should the M5S form a coalition with PD? And
soon after: should the PD form a coalition with PdL?
In many of its decisions M5S asks for some feedback from its supporters, via internet:
all the decisions are taken after some poll organized on the web. In particular, the decision
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on whether to ally or not with PD was the result of an interaction of the Movement with
the environment of its supporters. Moreover, even if M5S took its decision essentially after
this poll, some of its members also interacted with some of the PD members, looking for
some agreement. Of course, in real life, this is not the end yet: each party also interacts
with other people, the unsatisfied electors of the other parties, or those who usually do
not go to vote, the undecided voters, and so on, and also this interaction plays a role in
constructing the final decision. Of course, this does not happen only in Italy. Indeed,
this is really rather general and something similar also happened quite recently, in 2014,
in France, where the Front National won in several cities. Its leader claimed she was not
going to form any coalition with any other party: was this also what her electors really
wanted? Just to mention another example, a similar situation also occured in Germany,
after the elections in 2005.
Therefore, having clear in mind that we are describing a rather common situation, we
focus now on the Italian 2013 election. This is useful to fix some ideas, like for instance
the number of the main actors of the model. Our effort will be to derive a dynamics for
our system, and to deduce, out of this dynamics, the final decision of the three parties:
should they try to form a coalition or not? And, which are the reasons bringing to this
decision? Once a satisfactory model is proposed, is it possible to tune the parameters of
the model in order to get different decisions? The general settings we are going to use is
the one widely described in [4], and recently used in [7] for a similar, but simpler, decision
making problem. As we will see, we will use three different modes of fermionic operators
to model the parties, or, more precisely, their decision functions, see below, and more
modes of fermionic operators, labeled also by a continuous index, to describe the electors
of the different parties and the undecided voters. The reason for this particular choice
will be discussed in Section II.
Before starting, we like to mention that, to our knowledge, ours is not the first attempt
to use mathematics and quantum mechanical tools to model politics. Something in this
direction can be found, for instance, in [10] and in references therein. On the other hand,
as far as we know, there have been not many other attempts to construct mathematical
models in politics, except some old paper like, for instance, [11]. Slightly more extended
is the literature concerning the use of quantum ideas in decision making processes, see
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e.g. [12]-[15]. In none of these papers, however, an environment is introduced to drive
the dynamical behavior of the system, which, on the other hand, is probably the crucial
ingredient of our approach.
The paper is organized as follows: in section II we introduce the model and we derive
its dynamics. Some particular cases are discussed in Section III, while a more general
situation is considered in Section IV. Our conclusions are given in Section V. To keep the
paper self contained we discuss some essential (and, for the expert, well known) facts in
quantum mechanics in the Appendix.
II The model and its dynamics
In this section we will discuss the details of our model, constructing first the vectors of
the players, then the Hamiltonian of the system, and deducing, out of it, the differential
equations of motion and their solutions, focusing in particular to their asymptotic (in
time) behavior.
In our model we have three parties, P1, P2 and P3, which, together, form the system
SP . Each party has to make a choice, and it can choose only one or zero, corresponding
respectively to form a coalition or not. This is, in fact, the only aspect of the parties we
are interested in, here. Hence we have eight different possibilities, which we associate to
eight different and mutually orthogonal vectors in an eight-dimensional Hilbert space HP .
These vectors are called ϕi,k,l, with i, k, l = 0, 1. The three subscripts refers to whether
or not the three parties of the models wants to form a coalition at time t = 0. Hence,
for example, the vector ϕ0,0,0, describes the fact that, at t = 0, no party wants to ally
with the other parties. Of course, this attitude can change during the time evolution, and
deducing these changes is, in fact, the essence of the paper. Analogously, for instance,
ϕ0,1,0, describes the fact that, at t = 0, P1 and P3 don’t want to form any coalition, while
P2 does. The set Fϕ = {ϕi,k,l, i, k, l = 0, 1} is an orthonormal basis for HP . A generic
vector of SP , for t = 0, is a linear combination of the form
Ψ =
1∑
i,k,l=0
αi,k,lϕi,k,l, (2.1)
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where we assume
∑1
i,k,l=0 |αi,k,l|
2 = 1 in order to normalize the total probability, [8].
In particular, for instance, |α0,0,0|
2 represents the probability that SP is, at t = 0, in a
state ϕ0,0,0, i.e. that P1, P2 and P3 have chosen 0 (no coalition). As already stated,
this framework is quite close to that already introduced in other papers, see [8, 9], where
certain vectors, in a suitable Hilbert space, are used to describe few essential aspects of
the model under consideration. Similar tools (Hilbert spaces, vectors, operators,...) are
also used in [12]-[15], with the main difference that in these papers the Hilbert spaces
are quite often finite-dimensional. This will not be the case for us, because of the role
of the electors, which are naturally described using an infinite-dimensional Hilbert space,
see below. We believe that this is not just a mathematical trick, but it is also important
for the interpretation of the model.
As in [7], we construct the vectors ϕi,k,l in a very special way, starting with the vacuum
of three fermionic operators, p1, p2 and p3, i.e. three operators which, together with
their adjoint, satisfy the canonical anticommutation relation (CAR) {pk, p
†
l} = δk,l and
{pk, pl} = 0. More in details, ϕ0,0,0 is a vector satisfying pjϕ0,0,0 = 0, j = 1, 2, 3. Of
course, such a non zero vector always exists, and it is very useful since it turns out to be
an eigenstate of some of the operators used, within our scheme, for the description of the
system. Other eigenvectors of these same operators can be constructed out of ϕ0,0,0:
ϕ1,0,0 = p
†
1ϕ0,0,0, ϕ0,1,0 = p
†
2ϕ0,0,0, ϕ1,1,0 = p
†
1 p
†
2ϕ0,0,0, ϕ1,1,1 = p
†
1 p
†
2 p
†
3ϕ0,0,0,
and so on. Let now Pˆj = p
†
jpj be the so-called number operator of the j-th party, which
is constructed using pj and its adjoint, p
†
j. Since Pˆjϕn1,n2,n3 = njϕn1,n2,n3, for j = 1, 2, 3,
the eigenvalues of these operators, zero and one, correspond to the only possible choices
of the three parties at t = 0. This is, in fact, the main reason why we have used here
the fermionic operators pj: they automatically produce only these eigenvalues
1. Our
main effort here consists in giving a dynamics to these eigenvalues, or, better to say,
to the number operators Pˆj themselves, following the scheme described in [4]. In fact,
in this way, we can follow how the parties change their decision with respect to time,
regarding alliances. Hence, inspired by a mechanical scheme, it is natural to look for
1From this perspective, fermionic operators are to be preferred to other choices, for instance to bosonic
operators, since for them the eigenvalues of the number operators are all the natural numbers. Too many!
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an Hamiltonian H which describes the interactions between the various constituents of
the system. Once H is given, we can compute first the time evolution of the number
operators as Pˆj(t) := e
iHtPˆje
−iHt, and then their mean values on some suitable state
describing the system at t = 0. In this way we get what we call decision functions, see
formula (2.11) below. The rules needed to write down H are described in [4]. The main
idea here is that the three parties are just part of a larger system: in order to take their
decisions, they need first to interact with the electors. In fact, it is mainly this interaction
which creates their final decisions. Hence, SP must be open, i.e. there must be some
environment, R, interacting with P1, P2 and P3, so to produce some sort of feedback
used by Pj to decide what to do. The reservoir, compared with SP , is expected to be
very large, since the sets of the electors for P1, P2 and P3 are supposed to be rather
rich. For this reason the operators of the reservoirs will be labeled also by a continuous
variable2. In other words, while the operators describing Pj are just three independent
fermionic operators, those of the reservoirs, according to the literature on quantum open
system, [16], are infinitely many fermionic operators, see (2.3) and (2.4)3. Once again we
stress that adopting fermionic operators appears as a natural choice in our model, since
it will automatically produce decision functions taking values in [0, 1]: in this way all the
relevant situations are covered, from a ”will to ally”, which corresponds to one, to the
opposite attitude, corresponding to zero, with, of course, all the intermediate possibilities,
corresponding to decision which are not sharp.
The various elements of our model are described in Figure 1, where the various arrows
show all the admissible interactions.
In Figure 1, Rj represents the set of the supporters of Pj , while Rund is the set of all
the undecided electors. This figure also shows that, for instance, P1 can interact with R1
and Rund, but not with R2 or with R3. Moreover, P1 interacts with both P2 and P3. The
2Quite often, in fact, technical reasons suggest to replace infinite sums with integrals, and this is why
we use continuous variables rather than discrete indexes to label the voters.
3For this reason the Hilbert space of the electors is, contrarily to HP , infinite-dimensional.
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Figure 1: The system and its multi-component reservoir.
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Hamiltonian which describes, in our framework, the scheme in Figure 1 is the following:

H = H0 +HPBs +HPB +Hint,
H0 =
∑3
j=1 ωjp
†
jpj +
∑3
j=1
∫
R
Ωj(k)B
†
j (k)Bj(k) dk +
∫
R
Ω(k)B†(k)B(k) dk,
HPBs =
∑3
j=1 λj
∫
R
(
pjB
†
j (k) +Bj(k)p
†
j
)
dk,
HPB =
∑3
j=1 λ˜j
∫
R
(
pjB
†(k) +B(k)p†j
)
dk,
Hint = µ
ex
12
(
p
†
1p2 + p
†
2p1
)
+ µcoop12
(
p
†
1p
†
2 + p2p1
)
+ µex13
(
p
†
1p3 + p
†
3p1
)
+
+µcoop13
(
p
†
1p
†
3 + p3p1
)
+ µex23
(
p
†
2p3 + p
†
3p2
)
+ µcoop23
(
p
†
2p
†
3 + p3p2
)
.
(2.2)
Here ωj, λj , λ˜j, µ
ex
ij and µ
coop
ij are real quantities, while Ωj(k) and Ω(k) are real-valued
functions. We will come back on their meaning in a moment. The following CAR’s for
the operators of the reservoir are assumed:
{Bi(k), B
†
l (q)} = δi,lδ(k − q) 1 , {Bi(k), Bl(k)} = 0, (2.3)
as well as
{B(k), B†(q)} = δ(k − q) 1 , {B(k), B(k)} = 0, (2.4)
for all i, l = 1, 2, 3, k, q ∈ R. Moreover each p♯j anti-commutes with each B
♯
l (k) and with
B♯(k): {b♯j , B
♯
l (k)} = {b
♯
j , B
♯(k)} = 0 for all j, l and for all k, and we further assume that
{B♯(q), B♯l (k)} = 0. Here X
♯ stands for X or X†. Assuming these CAR’s is natural, since
it reflects the analogous choice for the three parties.
Another reason to assume CAR’s has to do with the meaning of the various terms of
the Hamiltonian H in (2.2). Before commenting this aspect of H , we notice that λj , λ˜j,
µexjk and µ
coop
jk are all interaction parameters, measuring respectively the strength of the
interaction of Pj with Rj , with Rund, and with the other parties Pk. The parameters
and the functions appearing in the free Hamiltonian H0, ωj, Ωj(k) and Ω(k), are related
to a sort of inertia of Pj , Rj and Rund respectively: in a very schematic way, we could
say that the larger their values, the smaller the amplitude of the variations in time for
some related dynamical variable of the model4. This is quite a general result, suggested
by many numerical and analytical computations performed along the years on similar
4For this reason, in analogy with classical mechanics, we have introduced the word inertia in connection
with these quantities.
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systems, [4]. H0 describes the free evolution of the operators of S = SP ⊗ R, where
R = (R1 ⊗ R2 ⊗ R3) ⊗ Rund. If, in particular, all the interaction parameters λj , λ˜j,
µexij and µ
coop
ij are zero, then H = H0. Hence, since in this case [H, Pˆj] = 0, the number
operators describing the choices of the three parties and their related decision functions
stay constant in time, see Appendix. In other words, in this case the original choice of
each Pj is not affected by the time evolution. HPBs, describes the interaction between
the three parties and their related groups of electors, and in fact PBs stands for Parties
↔ Backgrounds (the Rj’s) : pjB
†
j (k) describes the fact that, when some sort of global
reaction against alliance (GRAA) increases, then Pj tends to chose 0 (no coalition). On
the other hand, Bj(k)p
†
j describes the fact that Pj tends to form a coalition when the
GRAA decreases. This is because of the raising and lowering operators p†j and pj in these
interaction terms, coupled respectively with the lowering (Bj(k)) and raising (B
†
j (k))
operators of the supporters of Pj . A similar phenomenon is described by HPB, where now
PB stands for Parties ↔ Background (i.e. Rund), with the difference that the interaction
is now between the parties and a single set of undecided voters. The last contribution
in H , Hint, is introduced to describe the fact that the parties try also to talk to each
other, to get some agreement. Two possibilities are allowed, one in which the parties act
cooperatively (they make the same choice, and, in fact, we have terms like p†jp
†
k), and one
in which they make opposite choices, for instance P1 try to form some alliance, while P2
excludes this possibility (and we have terms like p†1p2). Of course, the relative magnitude
of µexjk and µ
coop
jk decides which is the leading contribution in Hint.
Before deducing the equations of motion for the relevant observables of the system,
it is interesting to discuss the presence, or the absence, of some integrals of motion for
the model. In our context, these are (self-adjoint) operators which commute with the
Hamiltonian, see Appendix. In many concrete situations the existence of these kind of
operators is used to suggest how the Hamiltonian should look like. Moreover, integrals of
motion can also be used to check how realistic our model is, [17]. Let us introduce here
Nˆ =
3∑
j=1
Nˆj =
3∑
j=1
(
p
†
jpj +
∫
R
B
†
j (k)Bj(k) dk
)
, (2.5)
with obvious notation. It is clear that Nˆ is the sum of the decision operators p†jpj plus the
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total GRAA. It is easy to check that
[
Nˆ,H
]
= 0, if all the µcoopjk and the λ˜j are all zero,
that is if the only allowed interaction between parties is non cooperative. On the other
hand, for instance, if at least one of the µcoopjk ’s is not zero, then Nˆ is no longer an integral
of motion, since in this case
[
Nˆ ,H
]
6= 0: cooperation gives a non trivial dynamics to Nˆ .
We can now go back to the analysis of the dynamics of the system. The Heisenberg
equations of motion X˙(t) = i[H,X(t)], [4], can be deduced by using the CAR’s (2.3) and
(2.4) above:


p˙1(t) = −iω1p1(t) + iλ1
∫
R
B1(q, t) dq + iλ˜1
∫
R
B(q, t) dq − iµex12p2(t)− iµ
coop
12 p
†
2(t)+
−iµex13p3(t)− iµ
coop
13 p
†
3(t),
p˙2(t) = −iω2p2(t) + iλ2
∫
R
B2(q, t) dq + iλ˜2
∫
R
B(q, t) dq − iµex12p1(t) + iµ
coop
12 p
†
1(t)+
−iµex23p3(t)− iµ
coop
23 p
†
3(t),
p˙3(t) = −iω3p3(t) + iλ3
∫
R
B3(q, t) dq + iλ˜3
∫
R
B(q, t) dq − iµex13p1(t) + iµ
coop
13 p
†
1(t)+
−iµex23p2(t) + iµ
coop
23 p
†
2(t),
B˙j(q, t) = −iΩj(q)Bj(q, t) + iλjpj(t), j = 1, 2, 3,
B˙(q, t) = −iΩ(q)B(q, t) + i
∑3
j=1 λ˜jpj(t).
(2.6)
These last two equations can be rewritten as
Bj(q, t) = Bj(q)e
−iΩj(q)t + iλj
∫ t
0
pj(t1)e
−iΩj(q)(t−t1) dt1
and
B(q, t) = B(q)e−iΩ(q)t + i
∫ t
0
3∑
j=1
λ˜jpj(t1)e
−iΩ(q)(t−t1) dt1,
which, assuming that Ωj(k) = Ωj k and Ω(k) = Ω k, Ω,Ωj > 0, produce∫
R
Bj(q, t) dq =
∫
R
Bj(q)e
−iΩjqt dq + iπ
λj
Ωj
pj(t), (2.7)
and ∫
R
B(q, t) dq =
∫
R
B(q)e−iΩqt dq + iπ
∑3
j=1 λ˜j pj(t)
Ω
. (2.8)
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We refer to [4] and to [16] for more details on this and similar computations. Here we
just want to mention that, for instance, the choice Ωj(k) = Ωjk is rather common when
dealing with quantum open systems. If we now replace (2.7) and (2.8) in the equations
(2.6) for p˙j(t), after some computations we can write them in a simple matricial form
q˙(t) = −U q(t) + ρ(t), (2.9)
where we have defined the vectors
q(t) =


p1(t)
p2(t)
p3(t)
p
†
1(t)
p
†
2(t)
p
†
3(t)


, ρ(t) =


η1(t)
η2(t)
η3(t)
η
†
1(t)
η
†
2(t)
η
†
3(t)


,
and the symmetric matrix
U =


ωˆ1 γ1,2 γ1,3 0 iµ
coop
1,2 iµ
coop
1,3
γ1,2 ωˆ2 γ2,3 −iµ
coop
1,2 0 iµ
coop
2,3
γ1,3 γ2,3 ωˆ3 −iµ
coop
1,3 −iµ
coop
2,3 0
0 −iµcoop1,2 −iµ
coop
1,3 ωˆ1 γ1,2 γ1,3
iµ
coop
1,2 0 −iµ
coop
2,3 γ1,2 ωˆ2 γ2,3
iµ
coop
1,3 iµ
coop
2,3 0 γ1,3 γ2,3 ωˆ3


.
Here we have introduced the following simplifying notation:
µl :=
λ2l
Ωl
+
λ˜2l
Ω
, ωˆl := iωl + πµl, γk,l := iµ
ex
k,l +
π
Ω
λ˜kλ˜l,
for k, l = 1, 2, 3, as well as the operator-valued functions:
ηj(t) = i
(
λjβj(t) + λ˜jβ(t)
)
, βj(t) =
∫
R
Bj(q)e
−iΩjqtdq, β(t) =
∫
R
B(q)e−iΩqtdq.
The solution of (2.9) is easily found in a matricial form:
q(t) = e−U tq(0) +
∫ t
0
e−U (t−t1) ρ(t1) dt1, (2.10)
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which is now the starting point for our analysis below.
Remark:– a particularly simple situation occurs when there is no interaction at all,
i.e. when λj = λ˜j = µ
coop
k,l = µ
ex
k,l = 0, for all j, k, l = 1, 2, 3. In this case, we trivially have
H = H0 and no interesting dynamics is expected. Indeed, this is reflected by the fact that
U becomes a diagonal matrix with purely imaginary elements, and the equations for each
fermionic mode produce oscillations for the creation and annihilation operators p†j(t) and
pj(t), and constant values for their products, the number operators Pˆj(t) = p
†
j(t)pj(t),
j = 1, 2, 3. Because of our definition (2.11) below, in this case all the decision functions
are constant in time. This is reasonable, since P1, P2 and P3 feel no interaction at all.
Once we have obtained q(t), we need to compute the decision functions Pj(t), which
are defined as follows:
Pj(t) :=
〈
Pˆj(t)
〉
=
〈
p
†
j(t)pj(t)
〉
, (2.11)
j = 1, 2, 3. Here 〈.〉 is a state over the full system. These states, [4], are taken to be
suitable tensor products of vector states on SP and states on the reservoir which obey
some standard rules, see below. More in details, for each operator of the form XS ⊗ YR,
XS being an operator of SP and YR an operator of the reservoir, we put
〈XS ⊗ YR〉 := 〈ϕn1,n2,n3, XSϕn1,n2,n3〉 ωR(YR). (2.12)
Here ϕn1,n2,n3 is one of the vectors introduced at the beginning of this section, and each
nj represents, as discussed before, the tendency of Pj to form or not some coalition at
t = 0. Moreover, ωR(.) is a state on R satisfying the following standard properties, [4]:
ωR(1R) = 1, ωR(Bj(k)) = ωR(B
†
j (k)) = 0, ωR(B
†
j (k)Bl(q)) = Nj(k) δj,lδ(k − q),
(2.13)
as well as
ωR(B(k)) = ωR(B
†(k)) = 0, ωR(B
†(k)B(q)) = N(k) δ(k − q), (2.14)
for some suitable functions Nj(k), N(k) which we take here to be constant in k: Nj(k) =
Nj and N(k) = N . Also, we assume that ωR(Bj(k)Bl(q)) = ωR(B(k)B(q)) = 0, for all j
and l. In our framework, the state in (2.12) describes the fact that, at t = 0, Pj ’s decision
12
(concerning alliances) is nj , while the overall feeling of the voters Rj is Nj , and that of the
undecided ones is N . Of course, these might appear as oversimplifying assumptions, and
in fact they are, but still they produce, in many concrete applications, a rather interesting
dynamics for the model.
Let us now call Vt := e
−Ut, and (Vt)j,k its (j, k)-th matrix element. Then some long
but straightforward computations produce the following result:
Pj(t) = P
(a)
j (t) + P
(b)
j (t), (2.15)
with
P
(a)
j (t) =
3∑
k=1
(
|(Vt)j,k|
2
nk + |(Vt)j,k+3|
2 (1− nk)
)
and
P
(b)
j (t) = 2π
∫ t
0
dt1
3∑
k=1
(
p
(j)
k (t− t1)Mk + p
(j)
k+3(t− t1)M
c
k
)
+
+2π
∫ t
0
dt1
3∑
k,l=1, k<l
(
p
(j)
k,l(t− t1)θk,l + p
(j)
3+k,3+l(t− t1)θ
c
k,l
)
,
j = 1, 2, 3, where we have also introduced the shorthand notation Mj :=
λ2jNj
Ωj
+
λ˜2jN
Ω
,
M cj :=
λ2j (1−Nj)
Ωj
+
λ˜2j (1−N)
Ω
as well as θk,l = λ˜kλ˜l
N
Ω
and θck,l = λ˜kλ˜l
1−N
Ω
, for j = 1, 2, 3 and
k, l = 1, 2, 3 with k < l. We have also defined the following functions:
p
(j)
k (t) = |(Vt)j,k|
2
, p
(j)
k,l (t) = 2ℜ
[
(Vt)j,k (Vt)j,l
]
,
where ℜ(z) stands for the real part of the complex quantity z.
Remark:– In formula (2.15) we have divided the dependence of the decision functions
Pj(t) in two parts: P
(a)
j (t) contains all the contributions coming from SP , while P
(b)
j (t)
contains the contributions coming from the electors. We see that these two kind of
contributions differ essentially for the presence of some integrations in P
(b)
j (t), while no
time integral appears in P
(a)
j (t). This has interesting consequences when computing the
asymptotic values of the decision functions, as, for instance, formulas (3.2) and (3.3)
below clearly show. We will see that, in both those formulas, P
(a)
j (t) → 0 when t → ∞,
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while P
(b)
j (t) does not tend to zero. In fact, this is rather general: the only non trivial
contributions in Pj(t), for large t, comes always from the integrals in P
(b)
j (t) and not from
P
(a)
j (t). In other words, the final decision is always a consequence of the whole story. This
will be made more evident in Sections III and IV.
III The parties do not talk to each other
We start considering a (sadly) realistic situation, i.e. the case in which the parties do not
talk to each other, and they only talk to their own supporters. In other words, each Pj
only interacts with Rj , but not with Rund or among them. Later in this section we will
see what happens when one, two and all the parties interact also with Rund while they
still do not talk to each other. Except for this last case, a reasonably simple expression
for the functions Pj(t) can be deduced analytically. However, sometimes it is convenient
(see Section III.3) to use a perturbative expansion in the interaction parameters5, while
in more general situations considered in this paper, see Section III.4 and Section IV, it is
surely more convenient to use numerical techniques.
III.1 Case 1: almost no interaction
Since the parties do not talk to each other, we have to put µexk,l = µ
coop
k,l = 0 in (2.2) for
all k and l. Furthermore, since they also don’t interact with Rund, we have to fix λ˜k = 0,
k = 1, 2, 3. In this case, the matrix U is particularly simple since it becomes diagonal,
with ωˆl = iωl + π
λ2
l
Ωl
. Then Vt is also diagonal, with obvious matrix elements. As a result,
formula (2.15) simplifies significantly:
Pj(t) = |(Vt)j,j|
2
nj + 2πMj
∫ t
0
dt1 |(Vt−t1)j,j|
2
, (3.1)
j = 1, 2, 3. We see that, not surprisingly, all the parties behave in a very similar way:
this is natural, because there is no difference between P1, P2 and P3, except, at most,
in the numerical values of their related parameters, and because each subsystem (Pj ,Rj)
5which, by the way, only works up to a certain extent.
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is independent of the others. Computing the integral in (3.1), with simple algebraic
manipulations we deduce
Pj(t) = nj e
−2π t
λ2j
Ωj +Nj
(
1− e
−2π t
λ2j
Ωj
)
, (3.2)
which goes to Nj when t diverges: Pj(∞) := limt→∞ Pj(t) = Nj, j = 1, 2, 3. The
conclusion is simple: in this case each party does what its electors decide. In other words:
P1 just does not care about other opinions, except those of R1. This, again, appears quite
reasonable. It is also interesting to notice that the speed of convergence of Pj(t) to its
asymptotic value depends on the ratio
λ2j
Ωj
: the higher this ratio, the higher this speed.
This means that the strength of the interaction Pj ↔Rj , measured by λj, is relevant also
to determine the speed of decision.
III.2 Case 2: P1 interacts with Rund
This is again a simple situation, from an analytical point of view. In fact, since the parties
do not talk to each other, we have again µexk,l = µ
coop
k,l = 0 for all k and l. On the other
hand, λ˜1 6= 0, but we still have λ˜2 = λ˜3 = 0. This implies that, because of the definition
of γk,l, U is again a diagonal matrix. As in the previous case we have
U = diag
(
ωˆ1, ωˆ2, ωˆ3, ωˆ1, ωˆ2, ωˆ3
)
,
and Vt is a diagonal matrix as well. The difference with the previous case arises because
of the fact that λ˜1 6= 0. Repeating the same steps as above, we deduce the following
analytic expression for Pj(t):
Pj(t) = nj e
−2π t µj +
Mj
µj
(
1− e−2π tµj
)
, (3.3)
j = 1, 2, 3, which implies, first of all, that P2(∞) = N2 and P3(∞) = N3. This is expected
since there is no difference concerning P2 and P3 with respect to what happens in Section
III.1. Moreover, we also deduce that
P1(∞) =
M1
µ1
=
λ2
1
N1
Ω1
+
λ˜2
1
N
Ω
λ2
1
Ω1
+
λ˜2
1
Ω
,
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which means that, this time, the final decision of P1 is influenced also by by Rund, i.e.
by λ˜1, N and Ω. This dependence is somehow masked if R1 and Rund share the same
opinion, i.e. if N1 = N . In this case, in fact, P1(∞) = N1, as if there were no Rund at all.
This can be easily understood since, if N1 = N , then, even if R1 and Rund are groups of
different people, still they all have the same opinion on what P1 should do. On the other
hand, if N1 6= N , it is easy to see that P1(∞) ∈]0, 1[: the final decision is not sharp now,
contrarily to what happens when λ˜1 = 0 (when P1(∞) = N1), and it depends on the ratio
between λ˜21Ω1 and λ
2
1Ω. In fact, fixing for instance N1 = 1 and N = 0, we get
P1(∞) =
1
1 +
λ˜2
1
Ω1
λ2
1
Ω
, (3.4)
which shows that the presence of Rund modifies the otherwise clear attitude of P1. In
fact, since N1 = 1 here, P1 would try to ally with some other party. However, since
N = 0, the electors in Rund would prefer that P1 does not form any coalition, and, as a
consequence, the result is a number which is neither zero nor one. However, if for instance
λ˜21Ω1 ≪ λ
2
1Ω, then P1(∞) approaches one. This is what we expect since, in this case, at
least if Ω and Ω1 are of the same order of magnitude, the interaction between P1 and R1
is much stronger than the one between P1 and Rund. Similar conclusions can be deduced
if N1 = 0 and N = 1.
Remark:– Similarly, if we assume that P2 (rather than P1) is the only party talking
with Rund, we would get a similar result: P1(∞) = N1, P3(∞) = N3, while P2(∞) =
M2
µ2
.
III.3 Case 3: P1 and P2 interact weakly with Rund
Once again we assume that µexk,l = µ
coop
k,l = 0 for every k and l. On the other hand, we put
now λ˜1 6= 0, λ˜2 6= 0, and λ˜3 = 0. Then U is no longer a diagonal matrix. Indeed it looks
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like
U =


ωˆ1 γ1,2 0 0 0 0
γ1,2 ωˆ2 0 0 0 0
0 0 ωˆ3 0 0 0
0 0 0 ωˆ1 γ1,2 0
0 0 0 γ1,2 ωˆ2 0
0 0 0 0 0 ωˆ3


,
and Vt has a similar expression: the only non diagonal elements of Vt which are non zero
are those with entries 12, 21, 45 and 54. Notice also that Vt is symmetric. In view of
the fact that, in this section, we want to deduce reasonably simple analytical results, we
start working under the assumption that max{λ˜1, λ˜2} ≪ min{λ1, λ2, λ3}: hence we have
interactions with Rund, but these are weak with respect to those P1, P2 and P3 have
with their own electors. So electors come first! To simplify the notation, we also fix here
Ω1 = Ω2 = Ω = 1. Under these conditions it is possible to deduce an analytic expression
for the matrix elements of Vt. In particular, the diagonal terms are always the same:
(Vt)jj = e
−ωˆjt if j = 1, 2, 3 and (Vt)jj = e
−ωˆj−3t if j = 4, 5, 6. The other non zero terms
depend on whether ωˆ1 is equal to ωˆ2 or not. We restrict here to this first case, since
explicit formulas are simpler. In this case we have, for instance
P
(a)
1 (t) = |(Vt)1,1|
2
n1 + |(Vt)1,2|
2
n2,
where
|(Vt)1,1|
2 =
∣∣e−ωˆ1t∣∣2 = e−2π(λ21+λ˜21)t, |(Vt)1,2|2 = γ21,2t2 ∣∣e−ωˆ1t∣∣2 = γ21,2t2e−2π(λ21+λ˜21)t.
Then
P
(a)
1 (t) = e
−2π(λ2
1
+λ˜2
1
)t
(
n1 + n2γ
2
1,2t
2
)
→ 0,
for t → ∞. Hence we deduce also here that the contribution of P
(a)
1 (t) to the decision
function for P1 disappears for t very large. Slightly more complicated is the computation
of P
(b)
1 (∞) = limt,∞ P
(b)
1 (t). With obvious notation we get:
P1(∞) = P
(a)
1 (∞) + P
(b)
1 (∞) ≃ N1 +
(
λ˜1
λ1
)2
N +
(λ˜1λ˜2)
2
λ42
[
λ22N2 + λ˜
2
2N
2λ22
−N
]
.
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A similar result can be deduced for P2(∞). Indeed we get:
P2(∞) = P
(a)
2 (∞) + P
(b)
2 (∞) ≃ N2 +
(
λ˜2
λ2
)2
N +
(λ˜1λ˜2)
2
λ41
[
λ21N1 + λ˜
2
1N
2λ21
−N
]
.
On the other hand, due to the fact that we have fixed λ˜3 = 0, nothing changes for the
asymptotic value of P3(t): P3(∞) = N3.
The above formulas for P1(∞) and P2(∞) show a strange feature, which is due to the
perturbative expansion considered here: suppose N = 0. Then P1(∞) ≃ N1 +
(λ˜1λ˜2)2
2λ4
2
N2,
and P2(∞) ≃ N2 +
(λ˜1λ˜2)2
2λ4
1
N1. Therefore, because of our approximation scheme, it may
happen that Pj(∞) is slightly larger than one. This means that these perturbative results
must be taken cum grano salis, since we must always have Pj(t) ∈ [0, 1] for all j and for
all t. Hence, the conclusion is that the perturbative expansion proposed here can only
give some suggestions of what is going on, but not rigorous results. Nevertheless, at least
in principle, the exact solution could still be found, due to the fact that the model is
linear, but we will not give its very complicated analytic expression here, since numerical
results are sufficient for us. We just recall that this analytical solution can be deduced
from (2.10).
A bit more complicated is to deduce an analytical result when ωˆ1 6= ωˆ2, while the
numerical plots can again be easily drawn in this case. For instance, in Figure 2 we plot
the decision functions Pj(t), j = 1, 2, 3, for a particular choice of the parameters of the
Hamiltonian and for a particular choice of the initial conditions, i.e. of nj , Nj and N .
Similar plots can be obtained for different choices of the parameters and of the initial
conditions.
From Figure 2 we see that P1 and P2, because of the interactions with Rj and Rund,
modify their original attitudes, going to a sort of intermediate state (i.e., they are not
able to get a sharp decision). After some short transient, P1 appears quite interested
in forming some coalition, while P2 loses (part of) its original interest very soon. The
situation is even more extreme for P3, which does not interact with Rund but only with
R3. In this case, P3 completely modifies his original attitude, following the mood of its
supporters, R3 (Notice in fact that, in Figure 2, N3 = 0). We see from the plots that the
interaction with Rund can produce some uncertainty in the final decision.
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Figure 2: P1(t) (top left), P2(t) (top right) and P3(t) (bottom) for µexk,l = µ
coop
k,l = 0, ω1 = 1, ω2 = ω3 = 2,
Ω1 = Ω3 = Ω = 0.1, Ω2 = 0.2, λ1 = 0.1, λ2 = 0.2, λ3 = 0.05, λ˜1 = 0.1, λ˜2 = 0.2, λ˜3 = 0, and n1 = 0,
n2 = n3 = 1, N1 = N2 = 1, N3 = N = 0.
III.4 Case 4: all the parties interact (also) with Rund
We conclude this section considering what happens if, again, µexk,l = µ
coop
k,l = 0 for all k and
l, but λ˜j 6= 0, j = 1, 2, 3. The parties do not talk to each other, but they all communicate
with their own electors and with the undecided voters. In this case U looks like
U =


ωˆ1 γ1,2 γ1,3 0 0 0
γ1,2 ωˆ2 γ2,3 0 0 0
γ1,3 γ2,3 ωˆ3 0 0 0
0 0 0 ωˆ1 γ1,2 γ1,3
0 0 0 γ1,2 ωˆ2 γ2,3
0 0 0 γ1,3 γ2,3 ωˆ3


.
In Figure 3 we plot the decision functions Pj(t) using essentially the same values of the
parameters as in Figure 2, except for λ˜3, which here is taken positive (λ˜3 = 0.1). As we
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see, the only major difference between Figures 2 and 3 is in the third function, P3(t),
which does not decay to zero, but goes to a positive asymptotic value: because of the
interaction with Rund, there is some chance for a coalition, now.
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Figure 3: P1(t) (top left), P2(t) (top right) and P3(t) (bottom) for µexk,l = µ
coop
k,l = 0, ω1 = 1, ω2 = ω3 = 2,
Ω1 = Ω3 = Ω = 0.1, Ω2 = .2, λ1 = 0.1, λ2 = 0.2, λ3 = 0.05, λ˜1 = 0.1, λ˜2 = 0.2, λ˜3 = 0.1, and n1 = 0,
n2 = n3 = 1, N1 = N2 = 1, N3 = N = 0.
Considering other values of the initial conditions, and in particular of N3, we arrive to
the following rather general conclusion: when λ˜3 = 0, then P3(∞) approaches, in all the
cases considered in our analysis, the value N3, so it can only be zero or one. On the other
hand, if λ˜3 6= 0, then P3(∞) approaches N3, but not so much, and in fact the numerical
values we obtain are always between zero and one. The decision of P3 is driven by R3,
but not only: the interaction with Rund makes the decision slightly more flexible. This is
the same effect we have already observed, for instance, in Section III.2, and, in fact, can
be seen as a general result.
20
IV What happens when the parties talk to each other?
Our next step is to consider what happens to the decision functions Pj(t) when we also
allow the parties to interact among them. This might occur far before the election, in that
temporal window in which, apparently, all the politicians seem to be interested in finding
some agreement with their competitors. This window, usually, does not last long: when
the election day approaches, then usually each party tends to attack the other parties more
and more. Moreover, after the elections, the winner might be interested in collaborating
with other parties only if it has not the majority in the Parliament. Otherwise, usually the
party who won the elections is not interested in any alliance at all. From a mathematical
point of view, the main difference here with respect to what we have done in Section III
is that we will now assume that µexk,l, or µ
coop
k,l , or both, are non zero.
IV.1 No cooperative effect
We will first consider what happens when every µcoopk,l = 0 while µ
ex
k,l 6= 0. In this case the
matrix U is block-diagonal, and the computations are not particularly difficult. In Figures
4 and 5 we plot, as usual, P1(t), P2(t) and P3(t) as functions of time, for a particular choice
of parameters and for two different initial conditions for S: we fix µex1,2 = 0.2, µ
ex
1,3 = 0.1,
µex2,3 = 0.15, µ
coop
k,l = λ˜j = 0, ω1 = 0.1, ω2 = ω3 = 0.2, Ω1 = Ω3 = 1, Ω2 = 2, Ω = 1,
λ1 = 0.1, λ2 = 0.2, λ3 = 0.05. In Figure 4 we put n1 = 0, n2 = n3 = 1, N1 = 0,
N2 = N3 = N = 1, while in Figure 5 we put n1 = 0, n2 = n3 = 1, N1 = 0, N2 = N3 = 1
and N = 0.
The difference with respect to the previous figures is evident: with this choice of
parameters the parties reach a final decision, but there exists a certain time interval, the
transient, during which the three decision functions oscillate between different possible
choices. This result, in our opinion, reflects well what we observe in real life: many
politicians say something one day and something different the day after. However, after
some time, they really have to decide, and this is described by the asymptotic values of
our plots. Also the fact that Pj(∞)’s are not really zero or one, but some intermediate
value, reflects well the difficulty of taking a decision, so there is usually no sharp position,
really. The only case when this happens, as we have already seen, is when the parties
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Figure 4: P1(t) (top left), P2(t) (top right) and P3(t) (bottom) for µex1,2 = 0.2, µ
ex
1,3 = 0.1, µ
ex
2,3 = 0.15,
µ
coop
k,l = λ˜j = 0, ω1 = 0.1, ω2 = ω3 = 0.2, Ω1 = Ω3 = 1, Ω2 = 2, Ω = 0.1, λ1 = 0.1, λ2 = 0.2, λ3 = 0.05,
and n1 = 0, n2 = n3 = 1, N1 = 0, N2 = N3 = N = 1.
interact just with their own reservoirs Rj .
Incidentally, it might be useful to observe that, in order to see the asymptotic behavior
of the functions Pj(t), in Figures 4 and 5 we have used a larger time interval than that
used in Figures 2 and 3, since asymptotic limits become evident only in larger intervals
(otherwise we would have seen just oscillations).
IV.2 No exchange effect
Let us now put µexk,l = 0. In this case, since µ
coop
k,l 6= 0, U has (almost) all non zero entries.
Not unexpectedly, the computations are a bit harder. However, the plots we get do not
differ much from those in Figures 4 and 5. In fact, Figures 6 and 7 share with those ones
the same main features, i.e. an initial oscillating behavior with a subsequent convergence
to a certain asymptotic value. The parameters of Figures 6 and 7 coincide with those of
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Figure 5: P1(t) (top left), P2(t) (top right) and P3(t) (bottom) for µex1,2 = 0.2, µ
ex
1,3 = 0.1, µ
ex
2,3 = 0.15,
µ
coop
k,l = λ˜j = 0, ω1 = 0.1, ω2 = ω3 = 0.2, Ω1 = Ω3 = 1, Ω2 = 2, Ω = 0.1, λ1 = 0.1, λ2 = 0.2, λ3 = 0.05,
and n1 = 0, n2 = n3 = 1, N1 = N2 = 1, N3 = N = 0.
Figures 4 and 5, with the only difference that here we put µexk,l = 0, whereas µ
coop
1,2 = 0.1,
µ
coop
1,3 = 0.08, and µ
coop
2,3 = 0.1. The initial conditions are given in the captions.
The conclusion is that the cooperative effect in the Hamiltonian produces almost the
same effect as the exchange term in H . The only difference is that the oscillations look
less evident, at least with the particular choice of the parameters considered here.
IV.3 Some further remarks
The first important remark is that, if we start from one of the cases considered so far, and
we slightly modify the values of some of the parameters of the model (including also those
which were previously chosen to be zero), the plots do not change much: the dynamics is
stable under these changes. For instance, if we plot Pj(t) fixing, as in Figure 2, µ
ex
k,l = 0,
ω1 = 1, ω2 = ω3 = 2, Ω1 = Ω3 = Ω = 0.1, Ω2 = .2, λ1 = 0.1, λ2 = 0.2, λ3 = 0.05,
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Figure 6: P1(t) (top left), P2(t) (top right) and P3(t) (bottom) for µ
coop
1,2 = 0.1, µ
coop
1,3 = 0.08, µ
coop
2,3 = 0.1,
µexk,l = λ˜j = 0, ω1 = 0.1, ω2 = ω3 = 0.2, Ω1 = Ω3 = 1, Ω2 = 2, Ω = 0.1, λ1 = 0.1, λ2 = 0.2, λ3 = 0.05,
and n1 = 0, n2 = n3 = 1, N1 = N2 = 1, N3 = N = 0.
λ˜1 = 0.1, λ˜2 = 0.2, λ˜3 = 0, and n1 = 0, n2 = n3 = 1, N1 = N2 = 1, N3 = N = 0 and
letting µcoopk,l to be slightly greater than zero, the changes in the plots are extremely small,
for sufficiently small µcoopk,l ’s. This, we believe, is due to the linearity of the equations of
motion of the model.
More interesting for us is to see what happens when, for instance, µexk,l and µ
coop
k,l are
different from zero, whereas λj = λ˜j = 0, j = 1, 2, 3. The plots are given in Figure 8, for
a particular choice of the parameters and the initial conditions. It is clear that there is no
asymptotic value, at least at this time scale: on the contrary, the decision functions Pj(t)
appear to oscillate quite a bit in time. This can be easily understood: our choice on λj and
λ˜j is equivalent to the lack of any backgrounds, and the parties only consult each other,
exchanging what we could call, with a slight abuse of language, quanta of decision in a non
conservative way (if µcoopk,l 6= 0). The parties have no input from their electors, and they
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Figure 7: P1(t) (top left), P2(t) (top right) and P3(t) (bottom) for µ
coop
1,2 = 0.1, µ
coop
1,3 = 0.08, µ
coop
2,3 = 0.1,
µexk,l = λ˜j = 0, ω1 = 0.1, ω2 = ω3 = 0.2, Ω1 = Ω3 = 1, Ω2 = 2, Ω = 0.1, λ1 = 0.1, λ2 = 0.2, λ3 = 0.05,
and n1 = n2 = n3 = 1, N1 = N2 = 1, N3 = N = 0.
are not able to decide what to do! Of course, as Figure 8 shows, there are several maxima
and minima in the decision functions corresponding to opposite attitudes. This is really
observed in politics, where sometimes a decision changes with a very high frequency6.
Despite of the highly oscillating behavior shown in Figure 8, it is enough to add the
effect of the reservoirs, by taking λj or λ˜j larger than zero, to recover some asymptotic
value (the smaller their values, the longer the time needed to reach this limit).
In our analysis, we have also considered several other choices of parameters and ini-
6In 2013, while Mr. Letta was the prime minister in Italy, the Members of the Parliament had to vote
the Fiducia, i.e. they had to vote and say if Mr. Letta should resign or not. No more than ten minutes
before the vote took place, an important exponent of PdL, Mr. Brunetta, said, in a TV interview, that
PdL was not going to vote in favor of Mr. Letta. However, only ten minutes after, Mr. Berlusconi, the
President of the same party, talking to the other members of the House of Parliament announced they
were going to vote in favor of Mr. Letta. This is exactly what we meant with high frequency!
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Figure 8: P1(t) (top left), P2(t) (top right) and P3(t) (bottom) for µ
coop
1,2 = 0.1, µ
coop
1,3 = 0.08, µ
coop
2,3 = 0.1,
µex1,2 = 2, µ
ex
1,3 = 1, µ
ex
2,3 = 3, λ˜j = λj = 0, ω1 = 0.1, ω2 = ω3 = 0.2, Ω1 = Ω3 = Ω = 0.1, Ω2 = 0.2 and
n1 = 0, n2 = n3 = 1, N1 = N2 = 1, N3 = N = 0.
tial conditions, including those in which all the parameters are non zero and not many
differences have been found. The scheme which emerges is the following:
1. if there is no reservoir at all (λj = λ˜j = 0), the functions Pj(t) oscillate, and no
asymptotic value is reached. On the other hand, it is enough that λj or λ˜j are
slightly larger than zero, to recover some limiting value. This suggests that what
really helps the various parties to get a decision is not the mutual interaction, but
the interaction with the electors, and not necessarily those voting for them.
2. The exchange and the cooperative terms in the Hamiltonian produce a similar effect.
The main difference is that, when µcoopk,l and the λ˜j are all zero, then an integral of
motion exists, whereas this is not true if some of the µcoopk,l is non zero. Also, the
amplitude of oscillations may be different.
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3. The relative magnitude of the ωj’s (parameters of the parties) and of the Ωj ’s
(parameters of the electors) is important: in fact we have found a strong numerical
evidence of the fact that when the Ωj ’s are larger than the ωj’s, the plots oscillate
much more than when the opposite happens or when they are of the same order of
magnitude. In both cases, if λj or λ˜j are non zero, Pj(∞) exists and it is a value
between zero and one, but this value is essentially reached monotonically when
ωj ≫ Ωk, j, k = 1, 2, 3, while it is reached after some (or many) oscillations when
the opposite inequality holds. This result reflects similar conclusions deduced along
the years and, in our understanding, it is related to the value of the parameters
of the free part of the Hamiltonian of our models, [4], which behaves, as already
stated, as a sort of inertia.
4. Looking at the various plots, and to the analytic results, see (3.2) and (3.3) for
instance, we see that an essential role is played by the reservoirs. The explicit values
of the other parameters, however, may change the asymptotic values of the various
Pj(∞) and of the speed of convergence: the parties reach some stable decision,
depending on whether they interact or not with the electors, but the decision, in
general, is related not only to Nj and N , but also to other parameters which,
therefore, acquire an important role in the model. This is clear, for instance, in
formula (3.4), where we have fixed N1 = 1 and N = 0: if
λ˜2
1
Ω1
λ2
1
Ω
≃ 0 then P1(∞) ≃ 1,
and P1 will try to form some coalition. On the other hand, if
λ˜2
1
Ω1
λ2
1
Ω
≫ 0, then
P1(∞) ≃ 0, and P1 will decide not to form any coalition.
5. Even if in some cases we have considered Pj(∞) as the final decision of Pj , this
does not mean that the parties decide how to behave only when t is extremely large!
This, of course, would be rather unpleasant. On the other hand all our plots show
that an asymptotic value is reached, most of the times, sufficiently fast. This means
that the decisions are made reasonably soon, and this procedure can be made even
faster by changing the interaction parameters, as we have already discussed.
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V Conclusions
In this paper we have modelled the interactions between three political parties, their
electors and people who still have not decided who to vote for. Our main aim was to
deduce the time behavior of what we have called decision functions, which describe the
attitude of the various parties to give raise or not to some political coalition. The main
result is that this decision can only be taken when the parties listen to the electors, since
in this case Pj(∞) exists and is easily related to the attitude of the electors themselves.
Otherwise, at least if some µexk,l or µ
coop
k,l is non zero, they simply oscillate between different
attitudes towards alliances, making essentially no choice.
Concerning now other approaches to similar decision-making problems, we first con-
sider the difference between our approach and the idea behind [8], which is also focused
on the deduction of the time evolution of some decision functions. Our feeling is that our
approach has a more direct interpretation, since we use an Hamiltonian where all terms
have a clear meaning. On the other hand, the master equation used in [8], makes less
evident any comparison with the real system. Moreover, using approaches as in [8], the
role of the electors would be somehow hidden because there is no explicit reservoir at all.
But this is, probably, just a matter of personal taste. More on the line of what is done in
this paper can be found in [12] and [13], where the dynamics of the system is produced
by some very simple Hamiltonians adopting an Heisenberg-like approach, as we do in
Section II. The main difference, we believe, is that while our Hamiltonian describes in
some details several realistic interactions, the ones adopted in [12] and [13] are so simple
that they can only be considered as effective Hamiltonians, surely useful to describe some
special aspect of the physical system, but constructed rather ad-hoc.
Of course, several things can still be done in our approach: first, a more detailed
analysis of the role of the parameters could be interesting. But, more interesting to us,
once we have deduced that one party wants to form a coalition, one could wonder: with
which other party? We believe that this question can still be answered using our strategy,
and this is part of our future work.
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Appendix: Few results on the number representation
To keep the paper self-contained, we repeat what already done in previous papers, [17, 18],
and we introduce here few important facts in quantum mechanics and in the so–called
number representation. More details can be found, for instance, in [19, 20], as well as
in[4].
Let H be an Hilbert space, and B(H) the set of all (bounded) operators on H. Let
S be our physical system, and A the set of all those operators useful for a complete
description of S, which includes the observables of S. For simplicity, it is convenient (but
not really necessary) to assume that A coincides with B(H) itself. The description of
the time evolution of S is related to a self–adjoint operator H = H† which is called the
Hamiltonian of S, and which in standard quantum mechanics represents the energy of S.
In this paper we have adopted the so–called Heisenberg representation, in which the time
evolution of an observable X ∈ A is given by
X(t) = exp(iHt)X exp(−iHt), (A.1)
or, equivalently, by the solution of the differential equation
dX(t)
dt
= i exp(iHt)[H,X ] exp(−iHt) = i[H,X(t)], (A.2)
where [A,B] := AB − BA is the commutator between A and B. The time evolution
defined in this way is a one–parameter group of automorphisms of A.
An operator Z ∈ A is a constant of motion if it commutes with H . Indeed, in this
case, equation (A.2) implies that Z˙(t) = 0, so that Z(t) = Z for all t.
In some previous applications, [4], a special role was played by the so–called canon-
ical commutation relations. Here, these are replaced by the so–called canonical anti–
commutation relations (CAR): we say that a set of operators {aℓ, a
†
ℓ, ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , L}
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satisfies the CAR if the conditions
{aℓ, a
†
n} = δℓn1 , {aℓ, an} = {a
†
ℓ, a
†
n} = 0 (A.3)
hold true for all ℓ, n = 1, 2, . . . , L. Here, 1 is the identity operator and {x, y} := xy + yx
is the anticommutator of x and y. These operators, which are widely analyzed in any
textbook about quantum mechanics (see, for instance, [19, 20]) are those which are used
to describe L differentmodes of fermions. From these operators we can construct nˆℓ = a
†
ℓaℓ
and Nˆ =
∑L
ℓ=1 nˆℓ, which are both self–adjoint. In particular, nˆℓ is the number operator for
the ℓ–th mode, while Nˆ is the number operator of S. Compared with bosonic operators,
the operators introduced here satisfy a very important feature: if we try to square them
(or to rise them to higher powers), we simply get zero: for instance, from (A.3), we have
a2ℓ = 0. This is related to the fact that fermions satisfy the Fermi exclusion principle [20].
The Hilbert space of our system is constructed as follows: we introduce the vacuum
of the theory, that is a non zero vector ϕ0 which is annihilated by all the operators aℓ:
aℓϕ0 = 0 for all ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , L. Such a vector surely exists. Then we act on ϕ0 with the
operators a†ℓ (but not with higher powers, since these powers are simply zero!):
ϕn1,n2,...,nL := (a
†
1)
n1(a†2)
n2 · · · (a†L)
nLϕ0, (A.4)
nℓ = 0, 1 for all ℓ. These vectors form an orthonormal set and are eigenstates of both nˆℓ
and Nˆ : nˆℓϕn1,n2,...,nL = nℓϕn1,n2,...,nL and Nˆϕn1,n2,...,nL = Nϕn1,n2,...,nL, whereN =
∑L
ℓ=1 nℓ.
Moreover, using CAR’s, we deduce that
nˆℓ (aℓϕn1,n2,...,nL) = (nℓ − 1)(aℓϕn1,n2,...,nL)
and
nˆℓ
(
a
†
ℓϕn1,n2,...,nL
)
= (nℓ + 1)(a
†
lϕn1,n2,...,nL),
for all ℓ. Then aℓ and a
†
ℓ are called the annihilation and the creation operators. Notice
that, in some sense, a†ℓ is also an annihilation operator since, acting on a state with
nℓ = 1, it destroys that state.
The Hilbert space H is obtained by taking the linear span of all these vectors. Of
course, H has a finite dimension. In particular, for just one mode of fermions, dim(H) = 2.
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This also implies that, contrarily to what happens for bosons, all the fermionic operators
are bounded.
The vector ϕn1,n2,...,nL in (A.4) defines a vector (or number) state over the algebra A
as
ωn1,n2,...,nL(X) = 〈ϕn1,n2,...,nL, Xϕn1,n2,...,nL〉, (A.5)
where 〈 , 〉 is the scalar product in H. As we have discussed in [4], these states are useful
to project from quantum to classical dynamics and to fix the initial conditions, as we have
done in (2.11).
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